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ABSTRACT
The ANC-led Government’s decision in October 2016 to withdraw 
South Africa from the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) came as a 
shock to those who regard South Africa as a champion of international 
criminal justice on the African continent. The decision was vehemently 
opposed by opposition parties and civil society in South Africa. The high 
court in Pretoria ultimately annulled South Africa’s notice of withdrawal 
from the ICC, and the ICC Repeal Bill was also withdrawn from the 
parliament.
This Article argues for South Africa’s continued membership of the 
ICC. The argument is informed by the history and traditions of the ANC, 
an internationalist liberation movement-turned-government and one of the 
early supporters of the ICC. The Article explores the normative roots of 
the ANC’s commitment to accountability for serious violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law, not only via the ICC, but also via 
incorporation of international criminal law in South African domestic 
? Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellow, Humboldt Universität, Berlin, Germany, and 
Professor of Law, Stellenbosch University, South Africa.
Washington University Open Scholarship
412 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 16:411
criminal law.  
While the Article does not pretend to know the political fate of the 
ANC-led Government’s future attitude to the ICC, it is argued that there 
are solid normative foundations on which the ANC should build to 
advance the project to end impunity for the worst crimes under 
international law. 
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1.? SOUTH AFRICA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ICC, INTERRUPTED:
WHERE WE STAND NOW
In October 2016, the South African government gave notice 
of its withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC). According to Article 127 of the Rome 
Statute, the withdrawal takes effect one year after the date of receipt 
of the notification by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.1
Apart from the notification of withdrawal, which falls within the 
executive domain, the judiciary and the parliament also have an 
impact on whether South Africa will eventually withdraw from the 
ICC. In a case before the High Court of South Africa (“Democratic
Alliance”), the Democratic Alliance (DA), a political party, 
challenged the government’s decision to withdraw from the Rome 
Statute.2 The court entered final judgment annulling the notice 
delivered to the UN Secretary-General. Before the application by 
the Democratic Alliance was finalized in court, the Minister of 
Justice initiated a legislative process in the parliament to repeal the 
Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court Act 27 of 2002 (“ICC Act”).3 The ICC Act implements the 
Rome Statute in South Africa, including establishing domestic 
violations of crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
crimes as defined in the Rome Statute. The repeal bill proposed to 
repeal the ICC Act in its entirety.4 However, after the judgment of 
the Democratic Alliance was delivered, the Minister of Justice 
1.  The written Instrument of Withdrawal, pursuant to Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute of the 
ICC, was signed by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa on 
October 19, 2016. See Declaratory Statement by the Republic of South Africa on the Decision to 
Withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-
XVIII.10 (Depositary Notification) (19 October 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/ 
CN/2016/CN.786.2016-Eng.pdf.
2. Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others 
(Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening) 2017 (3) SA 212 (GP) (S. 
Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/53.pdf.
3.  Shortly after the Instrument of Withdrawal was signed in October 2016, the Department of 
Justice published the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 
Repeal Bill.  Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act Repeal Bill 
B23-2016; See also Explanatory Summary of the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act Repeal Bill, 2016 GN R.747 of GG 40403 (3 November 2016). 
4.  Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act Repeal Bill B23–
2016 (S. Afr.).
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withdrew the repeal bill from the parliament.5 Nonetheless, a repeal 
bill can, of course, be reintroduced in the future. 
The decision by the high court in the matter of Democratic
Alliance has annulled the notice of withdrawal delivered to the UN 
Secretary-General.6 The court decided that the notice of withdrawal, 
which was signed by the Minister without prior parliamentary 
approval, is unconstitutional and invalid. The cabinet decision to 
deliver the notice to the UN Secretary-General without prior 
parliamentary approval, was also found unconstitutional and invalid. 
The court thus ordered the relevant members of government, 
including the President of the Republic of South Africa, to revoke 
the notice of withdrawal.7 It is important to note that the court did 
not wade into the merits of the debate on South Africa’s withdrawal 
from the Rome Statute. The court was determined not to overstep 
the separation of powers. The court reasoned: 
There is nothing patently unconstitutional, at least 
at this stage, about the national executive’s policy 
decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute, because 
it is within its powers and competence to make such 
a decision. What is unconstitutional and invalid, is 
the implementation of that decision (the delivery of 
the notice of withdrawal) without prior parliamentary 
approval.8
The court referenced Section 231 of the Constitution of the 
Republic,9 which deals with treaty making powers and the 
5.  National Assembly, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, Announcements, Tablings and 
Committee Reports, No. 33-2017 (Fourth Session, Fifth Parliament), http://www.pgaction.org/pdf/ 
2017-03-13-WithdrawalofRepealICCAct.pdf.
6. Democratic Alliance, supra note 2.
7. On March 7, 2017, South Africa delivered a notice of “Withdrawal of Notification of 
Withdrawal” to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Notice of Withdrawal deposited on 
October 19, 2016, was thus revoked. See South Africa: Withdrawal of Notification of Withdrawal, 7 
March 2017, C.N. 121.2017.TREATIES-XVIII.10 (Depository Notification), https://treaties.un.org/ 
doc/publication/CN/2017/CN.121.2017-Eng.pdf.
8. Democratic Alliance, supra note 2, at para. 81.
9.  Section 231 of the Constitution of South Africa provides as follows:
“(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the 
responsibility of the national executive.
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incorporation of treaties into South African law. The court 
concluded that according to Section 231 of the Constitution, prior 
parliamentary approval of the executive decision to withdraw from 
the Rome Statute and the repeal of the ICC Act are required before 
the executive branch could deliver a notice of withdrawal.10 Given 
the supremacy of the Constitution, the enactment of a repeal bill 
(should the executive branch decide to reintroduce a repeal bill) may 
still be challenged in the Constitutional Court on the basis that the 
repeal bill itself is in violation of the norms and values of the 
Constitution. Nonetheless the first step is for the parliament to 
debate the withdrawal from the Rome Statute and to repeal the ICC 
Act. While the parliament cannot cure the invalidity of the notice of 
withdrawal, the High Court emphasized that the Minister of Justice 
is acting well within his powers to present a repeal bill before the 
parliament.11
This is where we are now. South Africa’s withdrawal from 
the ICC has effectively been halted by the High Court, and South 
Africa’s government has dutifully withdrawn its notification of 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute. As of the time of writing, it was 
not clear whether the South African government still intends to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute. However, there is a political risk 
that the executive may initiate a withdrawal from the ICC in the 
future. Below is an exposition of the current treatment of 
international criminal law under South African law. The ICC Act 
(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been 
approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council 
of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection (3).  
(3) An international agreement of a technical, administrative or executive 
nature, or an agreement which does not require either ratification or accession, 
entered into by the national executive, binds the Republic without approval by 
the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, but must be 
tabled in the Assembly and the Council within a reasonable time.
(4) Any international agreement becomes law in the Republic when it is 
enacted into law by national legislation; but a self-executing provision of an 
agreement that has been approved by Parliament is law in the Republic unless it 
is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.  
(5) The Republic is bound by international agreements which were binding 
on the Republic when this Constitution took effect.”
S. Afr. Const., 1996, http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/constitution/SAConstitution-web-
eng.pdf.
10.  Democratic Alliance, supra note 2, at para. 71.
11.  Id. at para. 60. 
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constitutes a crucial part of this body of law. The paper concludes 
with some thoughts on the future development of incorporating 
international criminal law into the South African domestic legal 
system.
2.? THE CORE CRIMES UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DOMESTIC COURTS:
THE PRESENT POSITION
South Africa’s post-apartheid re-entrance into the 
international political system in the early 1990’s coincided with the 
renewed interest in international criminal law as a normative ideal 
and concretization of international human rights and international 
humanitarian law.
During this period, South Africa dealt with its history of 
gross human rights violations by establishing the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) which was premised not on 
amnesia and blanket amnesty, but rather on truth and 
responsibility.12 This is not to say that the TRC, which is quite 
different from other criminal prosecutorial modalities such as the 
various ad hoc international criminal tribunals and the permanent 
International Criminal Court, is not controversial. Indeed, it is not 
universally regarded as an acceptable alternative to criminal 
prosecutions for past atrocities, and it is today criticized as an 
inadequate vehicle to achieve its stated goals of truth and, even 
more so, reconciliation.13 Nevertheless, during the time of transition, 
the South African TRC was hailed as a beacon of hope for dealing 
with the past in a peaceful and restorative way.
The internationally renewed emphasis on responsibility for 
gross human rights violations became the hallmark of the 1990’s. 
This trend has inspired many countries, including South Africa, to 
adopt laws that incorporate aspects of international criminal law into 
12.  For a critical overview and reflection, see John Dugard, Symposium: Reconciliation and
Justice: The South African Experience, 8 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 287, 293-94 
(1998).
13.  For more on this debate, see Antjie Krog, Research into Reconciliation and Forgiveness at the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Homi Bhabha’s “Architecture of the New,”
30 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 202, 204-05 (2015).
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domestic law.
A.? The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court Act 
The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 was signed into law in the same year 
that the Rome Statute of the ICC entered into force.14 The Preamble 
to the ICC Act signals South Africa’s commitment to bring those 
who commit genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes to 
justice, either in a court of law of the Republic by prosecuting under 
its domestic laws, or in the event of the national prosecuting 
authority declining or being unable to do so, in the ICC. 15
The ICC Act criminalizes the crimes of genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes under South African law.16 The 
ICC Act directly adopted the definitions of these crimes as they are 
provided for in the Rome Statute.17 In order to achieve the stated 
goal of individual criminal liability for these crimes, the ICC Act 
provides that any person who commits an international crime is 
guilty of an offence under the ICC Act.18 The Act further provides 
for four grounds of jurisdiction with respect to the prosecution of 
these crimes, namely: territoriality, nationality, active personality, 
and universality.19
With respect to universality as a basis for the investigation 
and possible prosecution of the above crimes, the Constitutional 
Court, in National Commissioner of the South African Police 
Service v. Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre20
14.  The Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 
(“ICC Act”) entered into force on 16 August 2002. The text, with reference to the entry into force, is 
available at: http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/2002-027.pdf. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court entered into force on 1 July 2002. The text and an explanatory note is 
available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/resource-library/Documents/RS-Eng.pdf. 
15.  Supra note 14, at 1, Preamble to the ICC Act. 
16.  Supra note 15, at 5, § 4(1).
17.  Supra note 15, at 22-23, Schedule 1, pts. 1-3.
18.  Supra note 16. 
19.  See Max du Plessis, South Africa’s Implementation of the ICC Statute: An African Example, 5 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 460, 462-63 (2007). 
20. National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v. Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre & Another 2015 (1) SA (CC) (S. Afr.) [hereinafter “Torture Docket Case”]. The 
author was one of four academic amici curiae who submitted a brief in support of the investigation of 
the torture allegations to the Constitutional Court. The amici were: Professors John Dugard 
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(“Torture Docket Case”) declared the following: “the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction, for purposes of the investigation of an 
international crime committed outside our territory, may occur in 
the absence of a suspect without offending our Constitution or 
international law.”21 The Constitutional Court held that the South 
African police has not only the power to investigate alleged 
international crimes, but a legal and constitutional duty to do so.22
This duty extends to international crimes committed beyond South 
Africa’s borders and to crimes committed within the territories of 
countries that are not parties to the Rome Statute “because to do 
otherwise would be to permit impunity.”23 The duty to investigate 
extraterritorial genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes 
are subject to certain limitations, according to the Constitutional 
Court. These limitations include the principle of subsidiarity, the 
principle of non-intervention, and the principle of practicability.24
The Constitutional Court decision in the Torture Docket 
Case is a milestone in the domestic implementation development of 
international criminal law in South Africa.25 Unfortunately, as will 
be discussed later in this paper, the progressive application of 
international criminal law via the ICC Act has become a victim of 
its own success, leading to the dramatic announcement of 
withdrawal from the Rome Statute by the South African 
government, as mentioned in the Introduction, which has been 
temporarily stalled by the High Court.
(Leiden/Cambridge), Kevin Jon Heller (SOAS, University of London), Gerhard Kemp (Stellenbosch) 
and Hannah Woolaver (Cape Town). Max du Plessis & Christopher Gevers, Civil Society, “Positive 
Complementarity” and the “Torture Docket” Case, 1 ACTA JURIDICA 158, 164 n. 28 (2016). 
21. Torture Docket Case, supra note 20, at para. 47.
22. Id. at para. 55. 
23.  Id. at para. 32. 
24.  Id. at para. 61-64.
25.  Max du Plessis & Christopher Gevers, supra note 20, at 175. 
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B.? The Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act 
(“Geneva Act”) 
South Africa is a signatory to the four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949, and acceded to them in 1952.26 South Africa also acceded 
to the Additional Protocols of 1977 in 1995.27 However, it took the 
country a few decades to fully implement the Geneva Conventions. 
The Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act was only 
adopted in 2012.28 The main objects of the Geneva Act are: (a) the 
incorporation of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the additional 
Protocols into domestic law, and (b) the prevention and punishment 
of grave breaches and other breaches of the Conventions and 
Protocols.29   
With respect to enforcement, it is important to note that the 
Geneva Act provides for universal jurisdiction over war crimes in 
the form of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and the 
more restrictive forms of jurisdiction based on territoriality and 
nationality (but excluding passive personality) for other offences 
(including war crimes committed in non-international armed 
conflicts).30
C.? Domestic criminalisation of other crimes of international 
concern
In recent years, South Africa criminalized, via legislation, a 
number of crimes of international concern, thus giving effect to 
treaty obligations. Notable examples are the Prevention and 
26.  South Africa acceded to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 on 31 March 1952. See Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols, and their Commentaries, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE
OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreaties1949.xsp. 
27.  South Africa acceded to Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1977 on 21 November 1995. See supra note 26. 
28.  No. 8 of 2012: Implementation of the Geneva Convention Act, GN R. 536 of GG 35513 (12 
July 2012) [hereinafter “Geneva Act”]. For a discussion, see Christopher Gevers, Alan Wallis & Max 
du Plessis, Sixty Years in the Making, Better Late than Never?: the Implementation of the Geneva 
Conventions Act, AFRICAN YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 185-200 (2012). 
29.  See Geneva Act, supra note 28, article 2. See also HENNIE STRYDOM ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW 396 (1st ed. 2016). 
30.  For a more detailed discussion, see GERHARD KEMP, ROBIN PALMER, DUMILE BAQWA,
CHRISTOPHER GEVERS, BRIAN LESLIE, ANTON STEYNBERG, AND SHELLEY WALKER, CRIMINAL LAW
IN SOUTH AFRICA 588-91 (2nd ed. 2015). 
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Combating of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013 (giving effect to 
South Africa’s obligations under the UN Torture Convention of 
1984),31 the Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004 (providing for a 
domestic definition of terrorism, as well as giving effect to various 
obligations under international treaties and Security Council 
Resolutions), and the Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in 
Persons Act 7 of 2013 (giving effect to South Africa’s obligations 
under the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime32
and the Protocol on Human Trafficking). All three of the above 
mentioned legislative regimes that incorporate the three crimes of 
international concern also provide for enforcement mechanisms that 
include extraterritorial jurisdiction.33
D.? Crimes under customary international law
Section 232 of the Constitution of South Africa states: 
“Customary international law is law in the Republic unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.”34 This 
section incorporates customary international law into the law of 
South Africa. This provides for the possibility of prosecuting crimes 
like genocide, piracy, slave-trading and other crimes that have a 
customary status through the direct application of customary 
international law without the statutory implementation such as the 
ICC Act or the Geneva Act.35 There are, however, significant 
practical and legal obstacles, which makes prosecuting on the basis 
of customary international law in South African courts very 
difficult, if not entirely unlikely.36
31.  See generally Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 art. 2, 4, 5 [hereinafter “Convention Against 
Torture”].
32. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 
15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [hereinafter “Palermo Protocol”].  
33.  For a more detailed discussion, see KEMP ET AL., supra note 30, at 613-30. 
34.  Section 232 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, supra note 9. 
35.  KEMP ET AL., supra note 30, at 591. 
36.  Id. at 593. 
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3.? A HISTORY OF STRIVING FOR HUMANITARIAN AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IMPLEMENTATION
Philippe Sands’ historical and biographical narrative on the 
origins of the criminalization of genocide and crimes against 
humanity reminds us that developments in law and policy are not 
clinical processes devoid of personal and collective histories .37 That 
is also true for South Africa’s anti-apartheid struggle, spearheaded 
by the African National Congress (ANC) and informed by 
commitment to human rights and humanitarian norms. 
The legal and constitutional implementation and 
domestication of humanitarian and human rights norms depend on 
political will. “Political will” does not appear out of thin air; it is the 
manifestation of a complex combination of personal will 
(leadership), collective conviction, and a belief in a common 
purpose. The leader of “political will” in the democratic South 
Africa today is the governing party, the ANC. Before the advent of 
democracy, the ANC was the main liberation movement and the 
dominant force in the anti-apartheid struggle.38 The ANC’s views on 
humanitarian law, human rights and international criminal justice 
are therefore highly relevant, in both current and historical terms.
The ANC is Africa’s oldest liberation movement. It was 
established in 1912 as a movement for the political emancipation of 
black people in South Africa.39 Through the Freedom Charter it 
envisioned a post-apartheid, post-colonial South Africa free of 
racialism and sexism.40 For the first several decades of its existence, 
the ANC used peaceful means to further its goals and to resist the 
racist policies of the apartheid regime in South Africa. During the 
1950s, the ANC formed a political alliance with several other 
organizations, including the Communist Party of South Africa 
(SACP), which was established in 1921.41 The alliance is called the 
37. See generally PHILIPPE SANDS, EAST WEST STREET: ON THE ORIGINS OF “GENOCIDE” AND
“CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY” (1st ed. 2016). 
38. For an overview of the history of the ANC, see African National Congress, SOUTH AFRICAN
HISTORY ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/organisations/african-national-congress-anc.
39. Id.
40. For an historical account of the Congress movement, the Freedom Charter, and the liberation 
struggle, see generally ISMAIL VADI, THE CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE AND FREEDOM CHARTER: A
PEOPLE’S HISTORY (2015).
41. For an historical overview of the SACP, see South African Communist Party (SACP), SOUTH
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Congress Alliance. The Congress Alliance was formed as a united 
liberation front against the apartheid regime.42 Today, the SACP and 
the trade union federation COSATU, are in an alliance with the 
much larger ANC. This alliance came to power after South Africa’s 
first democratic elections in 1994, and currently controls more than 
60% of the seats of the parliament.43
Although not the only player in the broad anti-apartheid 
movement, the ANC was undoubtedly the preeminent liberation 
movement, recognized as such by a large part of the international 
community.44 Significance is attached to the ANC’s unilateral 
subjection to humanitarian norms for armed struggles. The ANC 
also subjected itself to the processes before the TRC.45 It is 
submitted that the ANC’s historical commitment to 
internationalism, humanitarianism, and the quest to end impunity for 
violations of humanitarian and human rights norms, is currently in 
question. The ANC’s decision to withdraw from the ICC is the most 
important exhibit in this regard. The ANC’s apparent animus against 
the ICC is also ironic. What if the ICC was available during the 
apartheid years? Would the ANC not also have utilized the avenue 
of an international criminal tribunal in the multifaceted struggle 
against apartheid?46 Indeed, it is a legal fact that apartheid was (and 
still is) a crime against humanity. This fact informed the collective 
international political and moral struggle against apartheid. It also 
informed the legal response that apartheid state’ actions and policies 
to be in violation of international law.47
AFRICAN HISTORY ONLINE, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-african-communist-party-sacp. 
42.  Vadi, supra note 40, at 1-83. 
43.  Supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
44. RICHARD SPITZ & MATTHEW CHASKALSON, THE POLITICS OF TRANSITION: THE HIDDEN
HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA’S NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT 1-18 (1st ed. 2000). 
45.  Indeed, the ANC was credited by the TRC for being more frank and co-operative with the  
commission than either the apartheid state or the Pan Africanist Congress (the smaller liberation 
movement). See Findings and Recommendations: The Legal Framework Within Which the
Commission Made Findings in the Context of International Law, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, vol. 6, § 5, at 642 (2003) [hereinafter “TRC Report”], 
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/vol6_s5.pdf.  
46.  For remarks on the success of the international anti-apartheid movement, see Paul Schiff 
Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 546-
47 (2005). 
47.  Lennox S. Hinds, The Gross Violations of Human Rights of the Apartheid Regime Under 
International Law, 1 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 231, 248 (1999); Newell M. Stultz, Evolution of the 
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The TRC’s mandate was to deal with various aspects of the 
conflict between the apartheid state and the liberation movements. 
The TRC’s mandate covered the period March 1, 1960 to May 10, 
1994.48 This timeframe not only covered the worst atrocities in 
South Africa, but also the armed conflict that played out between 
the apartheid state and the liberation movements, notably the ANC 
and its alliance partners, throughout the southern African region. 
The final report by the TRC revealed the moral and legal 
complexities underlying the armed struggle. The TRC report further 
revealed the application of the legal regimes relevant to the armed 
conflict between the apartheid state and the ANC and the other 
liberation movements.49
The ANC was, as a matter of principle, an adherent to, but 
not always a practitioner of, the norms of international humanitarian 
law. In 1980, the leadership of the ANC signed a declaration at the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) headquarters in 
Geneva, committing the ANC to be bound by the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocol I.50 For its part, the apartheid state 
acceded to the Geneva Conventions in 1952. The apartheid 
government did not ratify or accept the Additional Protocols. South 
Africa acceded to the Protocols in 1995, after the end of apartheid. 
As for implementation, it was only in 2012 that the Geneva 
Conventions, as well as the Additional Protocols, were implemented 
via domestic legislation.51
The first part of the TRC mandate period, March 1960 to 
1977, preceded the adoption of the Additional Protocols. South 
Africa acceded to the Geneva Conventions in 1952 and has 
United Nations Anti-Apartheid Regime, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY 1, 16 (1991). 
48. Section 3 of the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, read with the 
Interim Constitution of 1993, provides for the investigation and the establishment of the nature, causes 
and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period March 1, 1960 to 1993, see
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 § 3 (S. Afr.), 
http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf. The period for amnesty applications was
later extended by President Mandela to 10 May 1994, see Amnesty Cut-Off Date Extended, SOUTH
AFRICAN PRESS ASSOCIATION, http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/media%5C1996%5C9612/s961213d.htm. 
49. Findings and Recommendations: The Legal Framework Within Which the Commission Made 
Findings in the Context of International Law, TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION FINAL
REPORT, vols. 1-7 (2003), http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report/index.htm.
50.  John Dugard, Human Rights, Humanitarian Law and the South African Conflict, 2 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 101, 105 (1989). 
51.  Geneva Act, supra note 28. See also KEMP ET AL., supra note 30, at 588-91.
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remained a party ever since. The apartheid state was thus bound by 
the four Geneva Conventions for the period under consideration. 
More difficult to determine is whether the liberation movements, 
notably the ANC, was also bound by international humanitarian law 
norms during this first part of the TRC mandate period. As noted in 
the TRC Report, the nature of the conflict in South Africa was, 
facially, an internal conflict.52 However, regarding Resolution 
31029 of the UN General Assembly (1973), the TRC observed that 
the conflict in South Africa was “regarded not as an internal but as 
an international armed conflict.”53
Indeed, the “armed conflict involving the struggle of people 
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes are to be 
regarded as international armed conflicts in the sense of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and the legal status envisaged to apply to the 
combatants in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other international 
instruments are to apply to persons engaged in armed struggle 
against colonial and alien domination and racist regimes.”54 The 
TRC further noted that the ANC was, at the time, a non-state actor, 
thus lacking the legal capacity to accede to the Geneva 
Conventions.55 Regardless, the Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions (“Common Article 3”) was still found to apply. Two 
sources informed the TRC’s view that the ANC was, at a minimum, 
bound by the Common Article 3. First, regarding the relevant ICRC 
Commentary, the TRC noted that non-state parties to non-
international armed conflicts “become bound to apply the provisions 
of Common Article 3 upon ratification or accession by the state 
party to the conflict.”56 Second, the ANC had, via its public 
pronouncements during the period under consideration, considered 
itself “bound by the core principles enshrined in international 
humanitarian law.”57
The second part of the TRC’s mandate period, from 1977 to 
52.  TRC Report vol. 6, supra note 45, at 598. 
53.  Id. at 599. 
54.  Id.
55.  Id.
56.  Id.
57.  Id.
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1980, is significant because it is during this period that the 
Additional Protocols were drafted.58 The drafting history shows that 
the drafters intended Protocol I to supplement the Geneva 
Conventions and to bring national liberation movements within the 
protective ambit of humanitarian law.59 From the perspective of then 
South African government, the ANC was nothing more than a 
terrorist organization, whose members captured were simply 
prosecuted as ordinary criminals.60 With the adoption of Protocol I, 
the international community (or at least a significant part of it) 
intended to transform the legal status and classification of conflicts 
in places like Israel and South Africa.61 Members of the armed 
wings of the ANC and the Palestine Liberation Organization were 
no longer to be treated as ordinary criminals (or, indeed, as 
“terrorists”) but rather as freedom fighters.62 Their struggles were 
henceforth regarded as international armed conflicts and not as 
internal conflicts.63
The apartheid government did not accede to the Additional 
Protocols, and held the view that Article 1(4) of the Protocol I 
served no purpose other than to provide political, diplomatic, and 
legal cover for the liberation movements.64 For its part, the ANC 
during this period did not approach the ICRC to seek ratification of 
or accession to Protocol I. The TRC thus concluded that for the 
period of March 1977 to 1980, the Common Article 3, but not 
Protocol I, applied to the ANC and its armed activities.65
The third part of the TRC mandate period (from 1980 to 
1994) saw an intensification of the armed struggle and a significant 
58.  Id. at 600. For further background, see Amanda Alexander, International Humanitarian Law, 
Postcolonialism and the 1977 Geneva Protocol I, 17 MELB. J. INT’L L. 15 (2016).
59.  Convention Against Torture, supra note 31, at 40; U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., c.6 at 257, U.N. 
Doc. A/35/PV.81 (Dec. 4, 1980); U.N. GAOR, 23rd Sess., SPC. at 20, U.N. Doc. A/PV. 1731 (Dec. 2, 
1968) (calling on South Africa to accord POW status under the Geneva Conventions to captured ANC 
fighters).
60. See generally State v. Petane 1988 (3) SA 51 (SCA) (S. Afr.). The court concluded that 
members of the ANC were not to be treated as prisoners-of-war. In terms of the preliminary point on 
jurisdiction, the court held that the accused (a member of the armed wing of the ANC) could be tried 
for terrorism and attempted murder.
61.  TRC Report, supra note 45, at 600. 
62.  Caleb M. Pilgrim, Terrorism in National and International Law, 8 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 147, 
172-73 (1990). 
63. Supra note 62. 
64.  Id.
65.  Id.
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increase in the levels of violence inside South Africa as opposed to 
in the 1960s and 1970s when the theater of the armed struggle was 
largely in the neighboring countries in Southern Africa. An 
important event occurred on October 20, 1980. In a letter to the 
ICRC, the ANC, under the leadership of Oliver Tambo, asserted that 
it “intends to respect and be guided by the general principles of 
international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts” and 
that it would apply the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols 
“whenever practically possible”.66 There was some debate as to 
whether the ANC declaration was formally binding.67 The ANC 
declaration was not deposited with the Swiss Federal Council (a 
requirement in terms of Article 96 of Protocol I).68 For purposes of 
the TRC proceedings, this technical point turned out to be moot: the 
TRC reasoned that “it is the intention of the party making the 
declaration that is important . . . [The] ANC intended to hold itself 
bound by the Geneva Conventions and Protocol I.”69 Therefore, for 
purposes of the TRC process, it was clear that the ANC, in 1980, 
publicly and probably in good faith, accepted the normative and 
moral parameters provided by the most important instruments of 
international humanitarian law. The TRC concluded that it was 
irrelevant that the apartheid state had not acceded to Protocol I (as it 
had done with respect to the four Geneva Conventions in 1952). The 
armed conflict between the ANC and the South African state was 
thus covered by the norms set out in the four Geneva Conventions 
as well as Protocol I.70
A key finding of the TRC relates to the moral and legal 
dissonance resulting from the ANC’s internationalist and 
humanitarian inclinations of seeing the conduct of the armed 
struggle. The ANC’s viewpoint was directly opposed to that of the 
66. For analysis, see Andrew Borrowdale, The Law of War in Southern Africa: The Growing 
Debate, 15 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 41 (1982).
67. Id. at 42-3; F.R. Ribeiro, International Humanitarian Law: ‘Advancing Progressively 
Backwards,’ 97 S. AFRICAN L.J. 42, 58 (1980). 
68.  The Swiss Federal Council is the official depository of 79 international instruments, including 
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. See Depositary, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS FDFA, https://www.fdfa.admin.ch/eda/en/home/foreign-policy/international-
law/internationale-vertraege/depositary.html. 
69.  TRC Report, supra note 45, at 601. 
70.  Id.
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apartheid government of South Africa, which viewed the ANC as a 
terrorist organization, to be defeated militarily outside the borders of 
South Africa, and to be prosecuted under the domestic criminal 
justice system.71 Regarding the ANC’s conduct during the armed 
struggle, the TRC found that of all the major parties to the conflict, 
only the ANC committed itself to observing the principles of 
international humanitarian law.72
The ANC’s historical internationalism and commitment to 
international humanitarian and human rights law is well-
documented.73 The preceding paragraphs illustrated this with 
reference to the ANC’s unilateral commitment to humanitarian law 
during the armed struggle. The constitutional project of the early 
1990s that resulted in a progressive Constitution with an enforceable 
Bill of Rights was not a matter of compromise for the ANC; it was 
the centerpiece of the ANC policy positions.74 The ANC-in-
government’s commitment to international human rights law and 
other international regimes aimed at the advancement of human 
rights and accountability for human rights violations are also well-
documented. One example is South Africa’s early support for the 
ICC. Indeed, the ANC-led government was instrumental in the 
diplomacy and drafting processes that resulted in the adoption of the 
Rome Statute of the ICC in 1998.75 South Africa was also the first 
country on the African continent to fully implement the Rome 
Statute of the ICC through domestic legislation.76 However, the 
internationalist ANC – an ANC historically guided by international 
norms on human rights and humanitarian law – then decided to 
71.  Id.
72.  Id. at 642.
73.  For a discussion of the international and historical roots of the ANC’s human rights tradition,  
see generally Par Ousmane Barry, De L‘ANC a la Constitution Sud-Africaine: Continuité ou 
Rupture dans la Protection des Droits Fondamentaux?, 10 REV. QUEBECOISE DE DROIT INT’L 3
(1997).
74.  See generally Johann Van Der Westhuizen & Palmerston Mannya, Some Preliminary Notes on 
the ANC’s Draft Bill of Rights, 24 DE JURE 156 (1991). 
75. At the Rome Diplomatic Conference, South Africa was one of the so-called “Like Minded 
Group” [hereinafter “LMG”] of states. The LMG consisted of about sixty states, including the 
countries that played a leadership role, namely Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, 
Argentina, and South Africa. See John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the 
International Criminal Court and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 361, 368 (1999). 
76.  Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Regulations, GN R. 
1089 of GG 23761 (16 August 2002). For a discussion, see Kemp ET AL., supra note 30 at 586-88. 
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move away from the international criminal justice project in the 
form of the ICC. 
To understand why the internationalist ANC moved away 
from the ICC, a brief discussion on an important decision by South 
Africa’s Constitutional Court on the country’s legal obligations to 
investigate and prosecute crimes under international law, including 
the crime of torture as a crime against humanity, is necessary. The 
unanimous decision by the Constitutional Court in the Torture
Docket Case started with a brief exposition of the putative human 
rights-centered foreign policy of South Africa. In the first paragraph 
of the decision, former President Nelson Mandela is quoted as 
follows:
South Africa’s future foreign relations will be 
based on our belief that human rights should be the 
core concern of international relations, and we are 
ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity 
in the world we share with the community of nations 
. . . The time has come for South Africa to take up its 
rightful and responsible place in the community of 
nations. Though the delays in this process, forced 
upon us by apartheid, make it all the more difficult 
for us, we believe that we have the resources and the 
commitment that will allow us to begin to make our 
own positive contribution to peace, prosperity and 
goodwill in the world in the very near future.77
 From the aspirational statement on foreign policy offered by 
Nelson Mandela in 1993, the Constitutional Court next quoted from 
the Constitution, wherein the Court also found an echo of Mandela’s 
statement. From the preamble of the Constitution: “We, the people 
of South Africa, . . . adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of 
the Republic so as to . . . build a united and democratic South Africa 
able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of 
77.  Torture Docket Case, supra note 20, at para. 1. It should be noted that the included quote is 
from an article that Mandela wrote for Foreign Affairs magazine, in the year before South Africa’s 
first democratic elections that resulted in Mandela becoming the country’s first democratically elected 
leader.
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nations.” 78
Keeping Mandela’s statement and the Constitution in mind, 
the Court reasoned that the extent of South Africa’s “responsibilities 
as a member of the family of nations to investigate crimes against 
humanity lies at the heart of this case.”79 The matter before the 
Court was an application for leave to appeal a judgment of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), which dismissed an appeal against 
a decision by the High Court in Pretoria.80 The latter had issued a 
declaratory order that the South African police’s decision not to 
investigate the alleged torture (as a crime against humanity) in 
Zimbabwe of Zimbabwean nationals by the Zimbabwean police was 
unlawful and constitutionally invalid. Thus, the legal issue before 
the Constitutional Court was “to establish South Africa’s domestic 
and international powers and obligations to prevent impunity and to 
ensure that perpetrators of international crimes committed by 
foreign nationals beyond [South Africa’s] borders are held 
accountable.”81
 The Constitutional Court’s usage of Mandela’s article indicated 
its position on the interpretation of South Africa’s official political 
view on the role of human rights in international relations. In an 
earlier decision, Glenister v. President of the Republic of South 
Africa (“Glenister II”), the Constitutional Court reiterated the 
importance of international law to the South African constitutional 
order and interpretation of law.82 The Court made it clear that 
constitutional and legal interpretation is informed by international 
law. The Constitution has made it clear the status of treaties and 
customary international law in the domestic legal order.83 South 
Africa is a state party to the Rome Statute, and has incorporated this 
treaty into domestic law through the ICC Act. The Constitutional 
Court in the Torture Docket Case was dismissive of the argument 
78.  S. AFR. CONST., 1996. 
79.  Torture Docket Case, supra note 20, at para. 3. 
80.  For a comment on the high court judgment, see Gerhard Werle & Paul Christoph Bornkamm,
Torture in Zimbabwe Under Scrutiny in South Africa: The Judgment of the North Gauteng High 
Court in SALC v. National Director of Public Prosecutions, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 659 (2013). 
81.  Torture Docket Case, supra note 20, at para. 4. 
82. Glenister v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) (S. 
Afr.).
83.  See S. AFR. CONST. §§ 231, 232. 
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that the investigation of alleged crimes against humanity in 
Zimbabwe could have dire foreign policy consequences, reasoning 
that: “[p]olitical inter-state tensions are, in most instances, virtually 
unavoidable as far as the application of universality, the Rome 
Statute and, in the present instance, the ICC Act is concerned.”84
The Court noted that an investigation “within the South African 
territory does not offend against the principle of non-intervention 
and there is no evidence that Zimbabwe has launched any 
investigation or has indicated that it is willing to do so, given the 
period since the alleged commission of the crimes”.85 The Court 
practically considered Zimbabwe’s proximity to South Africa to be 
a relevant factor; thus, the possible presence (in South Africa) of the 
suspects in the future cannot be discounted, according to the 
Court.86 With reference to the effect of any decision not to 
investigate allegations of torture as a crime against humanity, the 
Court observed that South Africa cannot be seen to be tolerant of 
impunity for alleged torturers. “We must take up our rightful place 
in the community of nations with its concomitant obligations. We 
dare not be a safe haven for those who commit crimes against 
humanity.”87
The reasoning by the Constitutional Court in the Torture
Docket Case was mainly based on a reading of the Constitution and 
the ICC Act, as well as the application of relevant international law 
principles. The outcome of the case did not turn on South Africa’s 
supposed human rights-oriented foreign policy.88 However, it is 
nevertheless of some importance that the Court (a) contextualized 
the judgment in the human rights-based foreign policy statements 
from the Mandela-era and (b) rejected the police’s submission that 
investigations of alleged torture against Zimbabwean officials might 
harm bilateral relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe.
The document that reflects South Africa’s government 
policy on foreign affairs is the White Paper entitled: Building a 
84.  Torture Docket Case, supra note 20, at para. 74. 
85.  Id. at para. 78. 
86.  Id. at para. 79. 
87.  Id. at para. 80. 
88.  Torture Docket Case, supra note 20. 
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Better World: The Diplomacy of Ubuntu.89 In the South African 
legislative process, a whitepaper is normally a broad statement of 
government policy. Three paragraphs from this whitepaper reflect
the gist of the Government’s priorities and emphasis: 
Foreign policy, being an extension of national 
policy and interests, is an important component in 
South Africa’s strategy for development and social 
purposes. Creating a better South Africa and 
contributing to a better and safer Africa in a better 
world encapsulates and conceptualises a South 
African foreign policy that enables the country to be 
a good international citizen…As the country engages 
with its region, continent and the international 
community, it seeks to build an environment in 
which it can realise its national socio-economic 
agenda as well as its political and security interests. 
90
….
South Africa subscribes to the principles of 
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of other states.91
….
[South Africa’s] greatest asset lies in the power of 
its example. In an uncertain world, characterised by a 
competition of values, South Africa’s diplomacy of 
Ubuntu, focusing on our common humanity, provides 
an inclusive and constructive world view to shape the 
evolving global order.92
 Reading through the document, one gets a sense that South 
Africa has indeed moved away from the explicitly human rights-
centered approach towards a more developmental approach, which 
89.  White Paper on South African Foreign Policy, Building a Better World: The Diplomacy of  
Ubuntu, DEP’T OF INT’L RELATIONS AND COOPERATION (May 13, 2011) (S. Afr.).
90.  Id. at 10. 
91.  Id. at 20. 
92.  Id. at 36. 
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emphasizes non-interference, socio-economic development, and 
national interest. An echo from the Mandela-era might be the 
statement that South Africa’s “greatest asset lies in the power of its 
example.”93
 The position that the South African government took in the 
Torture Docket Case, together with the more recent failure to arrest 
President Omar Al-Bashir during his visit to South Africa, which 
was found to be in violation of the Constitution, international 
obligations and South African law, points to a clear break with the 
past support by the ANC for the norms and enforcement 
mechanisms of international humanitarian and international criminal 
law.94 In the Torture Docket Case, it is submitted that the Court 
should have made it clear that the executive (via the police and 
eventually the prosecuting authority) is not expected to just 
“endure” political tension for the sake of the greater good; the 
executive should positively set such examples as envisioned by 
Nelson Mandela in 1993 and referenced in the White Paper on 
Foreign Policy.95
The fallout from President Al-Bashir’s visit to South Africa in 
2015, and the ANC-government’s subsequent defeats in the High 
Court and subsequently the Supreme Court of Appeal, has led to the 
government’s decision to withdraw South Africa from the Rome 
Statute of the ICC.96
93.  Id.
94.  In 2009 and 2010 the ICC issued arrest warrants for President Al Bashir for war crimes, crimes
against humanity and genocide (The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-
01/09-1, Warrant of Arrest (Mar. 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_01514. 
PDF; The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-95, Second Warrant of 
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (July 12, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ 
CR2010_04825.PDF. See The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v. The Southern 
Africa Litigation Centre and Others 2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA) (S. Afr.).   
95.  This is not to suggest that states can simply ignore the implications of foreign relations and  
realpolitik. Legislative and enforcement schemes in the context of universal jurisdiction that do not 
provide for appropriate filters or checks can have not only dire diplomatic and political consequences, 
but indeed can lead to significant setbacks for the international criminal justice project. On the Belgian 
example, see CHRIS VAN DEN WYNGAERT, BART DE SMET, & STEVEN VANDROMME, STRAFRECHT EN 
STRAFPROCESRECHT IN HOOFDLIJNEN 823-24 (Maklu Uitgevers et al. eds., 9th ed. 2014). 
96.  For an overview and discussion of the legal and political saga surrounding President Al-
Bashir’s visit to South Africa, and the aftermath of that visit, see George Barrie, Al-Bashir and the tale 
of two cities: The law of Rome and the law of Pretoria, 2017 J. S. AFR. L. 149. For discussions of the 
decision by the high court in the matter of Southern Africa Litigation Centre & others v. Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development, see Erika de Wet, The Implications of President Al-Bashir’s 
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 The notice of withdrawal, which was declared to be invalid by 
the High Court in DA v. Minister of International Relations, stated 
that the interpretation that was given to South Africa’s commitment 
to fight impunity, via the domestic implementation of the Rome 
Statute and the concomitant obligation to cooperate with the ICC, is 
at times difficult to reconcile with the demands of a complex world, 
and regional diplomatic efforts to bring about the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts on the African continent.97 The document 
seemed to convey the Government’s view that the Rome Statute 
unleashed contradictory forces that do more harm than good; that 
international criminal justice embodied by the ICC presents a binary 
choice between peace and justice. So, the subtext of the instrument 
of withdrawal was the anachronistic “peace versus justice” debate. 
Whether South Africa will ultimately withdraw from the ICC is an 
open-ended question. The observations below are premised on the 
political risk that the executive may still want to take South Africa 
out of the ICC. 
4.? SCENARIOS FOR THE WAY FORWARD
Some may point to the proposed expansion of the 
jurisdiction of the African Court of Human Rights to provide for 
criminal jurisdiction over individuals accused of serious crimes 
under international law as a more palatable alternative to the ICC. 
Indeed, the African Union (AU) already took steps in this direction 
with the adoption of the so-called Malabo Protocol of 2014,98 which 
amends the protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
Visit to South Africa for International and Domestic Law, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1049 (2015); Dire 
Tladi, The Duty on South Africa to Arrest and Surrender President Al-Bashir under South African and 
International Law, 13 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1027 (2015). 
97. Declaratory Statement by the Republic of South Africa on the Decision to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court at para. 2, C.N.786.2016.TREATIES-XVIII.10 
(Depositary Notification) (19 October 2016), https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2016/ CN.786. 
2016-Eng.pdf.
98. Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights, ASSEMBLY OF THE AFRICAN UNION, Assembly/AU/Dec.529(XXIII) [hereinafter
“Malabo Protocol”], https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7804-treaty-0045_-_protocol_on_ amend- 
ments_to_the_protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights_e-
compressed.pdf; see also THE AFRICAN CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE MALABO
PROTOCOL 219-256 (Gerhard Werle & Moritz Vormbaum eds., 2017). 
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and Human Rights.99 The Protocol has yet to be embraced by AU 
members, with only a handful of states thus far signing the 
Protocol.100 South Africa has not yet signed the Protocol.101 A 
provision is provided to set up an international criminal law section 
in the Human Rights Court.102 The international criminal law 
section will have jurisdiction over a long list of crimes, including 
the most serious crimes under international law, namely genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity.103 It will have jurisdiction 
over individuals and corporations.104 The international criminal law 
section will exercise complementary jurisdiction, meaning that it 
will only hear cases if States are either unwilling or unable to carry 
out investigations or prosecutions of the relevant crimes.105
The Malabo Protocol, as an African answer to continental 
human rights concerns and obligations,106 has its merits, but also 
significant problems that will not be discussed here. Suffice to say 
that a fully functioning international criminal law section of the 
African Human Rights Court will require meaningful commitments 
in terms of financial and human resources. It will require the 
political will to implement domestic laws to empower states to 
investigate and prosecute alleged criminals. However, there is one 
99.  For a comprehensive commentary on the Malabo Protocol, see Werle & Vormbaum, supra note 
98.
100.  For a status list, see List of Countries Which Have Signed, Ratified/Acceded to the Protocol on 
Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights,
AFRICAN UNION, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7804-sl-protocol_on_amendments_to_the_ 
protocol_on_the_statute_of_the_african_court_of_justice_and_human_rights.pdf (updated June 15, 
2017).
101.  Id.
102.  Malabo Protocol, supra note 98, art. 3. 
103. Malabo Protocol, supra note 98. The crimes of genocide (Article 28B), crimes against 
humanity (Article 28C), war crimes (Article 28D), and the crime of aggression (Article 28M), are 
largely modeled on the crimes as provided for in the Rome Statute of the ICC. However, the Malabo 
definitions contain expansions of the crimes, for instance, a broadening of the chapeau, in the case of 
crimes against humanity, and new underlying acts, in the case of genocide. For further analysis, see
Kai Ambos, Genocide (Article 28B), Crimes Against Humanity (Article 28C), War Crimes (Article 
28D) and the Crime of Aggression (Article 28M), in THE AFRICAN CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY ON THE MALABO PROTOCOL 31 (Gerhard Werle & Moritz Vormbaum eds., 2017). 
104. Malabo Protocol, supra note 98, art. 46B (individual criminal responsibility); art. 46C 
(corporate criminal liability).
105.  Malabo Protocol, supra note 98, art. 46H (complementary jurisdiction).
106. Ademola Abass, Historical and Political Background to the Malabo Protocol, in THE
AFRICAN CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE MALABO PROTOCOL 11, 16 (Gerhard Werle & 
Moritz Vormbaum eds., 2017). 
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provision in the Malabo Protocol, the immunities clause,107 that 
holds the potential to be the undoing of the project to find African 
solutions to international and transnational crimes in Africa. It 
provides: “No charges shall be commenced or continued before the 
Court against any serving AU Head of State or Government, or 
anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity, or other senior 
state officials based on their functions, during their tenure of 
office.”108 The immunities clause in the Malabo Protocol is a radical 
departure from the statutes of other international criminal tribunals 
which explicitly provide for the irrelevance of immunities. This 
clause will inevitably lead to de facto impunity.
Regional efforts aside, the more realistic options to fill the 
void in the event of a successful withdrawal of South Africa from 
the ICC, would, first, be a constitutional challenge to any repeal act 
by the parliament that does not provide for a replacement of the 
substantive parts of the potentially repealed ICC Act. This will be 
necessary, because a simple repeal, as per the first (withdrawn) 
version of the repeal bill, will have the effect of removing from 
South African domestic criminal law the ICC crimes of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The Geneva Act provides 
for war crimes but it does so in a more limited way than the ICC 
Act. Removing the crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity 
from domestic criminal law should be challenged on the basis that it 
offends one of the foundational values of the Constitution, namely 
human dignity.
Another possibility would be to rely on customary 
international law to prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity 
in South Africa. It falls beyond the scope of this paper to fully 
explore this possibility, but the prospects of a common-law 
prosecution are not very good, at least in practical and policy terms. 
Having said that, it is worth to note that the Constitutional Court did 
107.  Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, FIRST MEETING OF THE SPECIALIZED TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE AND 
LEGAL AFFAIRS, EX.CL/846(XXV), Annex 5, art. 46A bis (2014), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ 
African_Court_Protocol_-_July_2014.pdf. For a discussion, see Dire Tladi, Immunities (Article 
46Abis), in THE AFRICAN CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON THE MALABO PROTOCOL 203
(Gerhard Werle & Moritz Vormbaum eds., 2017).
108.  Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice 
and Human Rights, supra note 109, at Annex 5, art. 46A bis.
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leave the door open for a formal recognition of certain crimes under 
customary international law as being part of domestic criminal law. 
The Court stated: 
Along with torture, the international crimes of 
piracy, slave-trading, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and apartheid require states, even 
in the absence of binding international-treaty law, to 
suppress such conduct because 'all states have an 
interest as they violate values that constitute the 
foundation of the world public order'. Torture, 
whether on the scale of crimes against humanity or 
not, is a crime in South Africa in terms of section 232 
of the Constitution because the customary 
international law prohibition against torture has the 
status of a peremptory norm. 
Furthermore, along with genocide and war crimes 
there is an international treaty law obligation to 
prosecute torture. The Convention against Torture, an 
international convention drafted specifically to deal 
with the crime of torture, obliges states parties to 
'ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its 
criminal law', together with an 'attempt to commit 
torture' and 'complicity and participation in torture'.
South Africa has fulfilled this international law 
obligation through the recent enactment of the 
Torture Act. In effect, torture is criminalized in South 
Africa under section 232 of the Constitution and the 
Torture Act whilst torture on the scale of crimes 
against humanity is criminalized under s 232 of the 
Constitution, the Torture Act and the ICC Act. 
Regional and sub-regional law also permits South 
Africa to take necessary measures against crimes 
against humanity, including torture.109
109.  Torture Docket Case, supra note 20, at paras. 37-39. 
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The above dicta of the Constitutional Court underscores the 
importance of the Proposed International Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity.110 The
merits of this project will not be discussed here. Suffice to note that 
a treaty like this, which is not linked to the ICC or supranational 
structures which might be politically controversial, provides strong 
normative and constitutional pressure on incorporating international 
criminal law into the framework of domestic legislation.111
I would argue that the most important priority should be for the 
parliamentary ANC to take the history of their great movement to 
heart, to appeal to the better angels of the party of Mandela and 
Tambo, and to do the right thing: reject any future ICC repeal bill, 
or, alternatively, to make sure that the repeal bill contains the full 
domestication of crimes against humanity, genocide, and war 
crimes. That will be consistent with the historical attitude of the 
ANC towards human rights, humanitarian principles, and the 
international quest to end impunity for the worst crimes under 
international law. 
.
110. For the English text, see Proposed International Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW WHITNEY R.
HARRIS WORLD LAW INSTITUTE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY INITIATIVE (Aug. 2010), http:// 
law.wustl.edu/harris/cah/docs/EnglishTreatyFinal.pdf. For the Corrigendum, see Corrigendum to
Proposed International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity,
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW WHITNEY R. HARRIS WORLD LAW INSTITUTE CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY INITIATIVE (Feb. 2012), http://law.wustl.edu/harris/CAH/docs/Corrigendum-Pro-
posedConvention.pdf.
111.  See also Payam Akhavan, The Universal Repression of Crimes Against Humanity Before 
National Jurisdictions: The Need for a Treaty-based Obligation to Prosecute, in FORGING A 
CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 28 (Leila Nadya Sadat ed. 2011).
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